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Abstract
This paper analyzes a puzzling aspect of retirement behavior known as “unretirement,” in 
which retirees appear to reverse their retirement decisions and return to work.  Using panel data 
from the Health and Retirement Study, I show that nearly 50 percent of retirees follow a 
nontraditional retirement path that involves partial retirement or unretirement, and that 26 
percent of retirees later unretire. I explore two possible explanations: 1) unretirement transitions 
are unexpected, resulting from failures in planning or financial shocks; and 2) unretirement 
transitions are anticipated prior to retirement, reflecting a more complex retirement process. I 
present a theoretical model that illustrates how both unplanned and planned unretirement might 
arise in a life-cycle framework—the former via uncertainty in asset returns and medical 
expenses, and the latter through a phenomenon I call “burnout and recovery,” in which 
individuals systematically burn out on their career jobs, retire, then return to the labor force after 
a period of recovery.  Using data on expectations and realizations of work during retirement, I 
show that unretirement was anticipated for the vast majority (82 percent) of those returning to 
work, and is not a result of financial shocks, poor planning or low wealth accumulation.  For the 
small minority who unexpectedly returned to work, the evidence points to preference shocks—
that is, discovering retirement leisure less satisfying than expected.  If anything, expectations err 
on the side of excessive pessimism about retirement rather than unwarranted optimism; this 
finding complements a growing literature on consumption behavior at retirement which has 
suggested that realized retirement turns out better than expected for most people.  
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Retirement marks a sharp reduction or cessation of lifetime work effort.  Yet, a curious 
fact about retirement behavior is that many people later reverse their retirement decision and 
return to work.  Many have speculated that economic shocks are a likely cause.  Indeed, rates of 
return on many financial assets are uncertain, health care expenses may increase unexpectedly, 
and no one knows the evolution of his health or life span.  Information shocks are also possible, 
if after retiring some individuals learn they did not save enough
1 or discover they do not like 
retirement as much as anticipated.  An alternative explanation is that “unretirement” transitions 
are planned.  For example, Diamond and Hausman (1984) note that the social security earnings 
test could generate planned unretirement, at least in theory.  More generally, unretirement could 
be part of a multi-stage retirement process; an intentional way of transitioning gradually out of 
the labor force, much like partial retirement.   
The welfare implications of these two explanations are quite different, and the retirement 
literature offers little guidance as to which is the more likely reason.  Even though unretirement 
could be optimal in a theoretical life cycle model, whether on account of uncertainty or some 
predictable force, many empirical analyses assume retirement is an absorbing state.  Of those that 
relax this assumption (e.g., Berkovec and Stern, 1991, Blau, 1994, French, 2005, Rust and 
Phelan, 1997), only Blau (1994) and Rust and Phelan (1997) examine whether their models can 
predict observed re-entry rates.  Although many authors have noted the existence of so-called 
reverse transitions in the data, rarely has unretirement been the object of direct study, perhaps 
because unretirement transitions were often thought to be relatively infrequent (see e.g., Reimers 
and Honig, 1993, Rust and Phelan, 1997).
1 A growing literature has examined whether such shocks can explain the seemingly “irrational” drops in 
consumption spending after retirement known as the retirement-consumption puzzle (Banks et al., 1998, Haider 
and Stephens, 2004, Hurd and Rohwedder, 2003, Smith, 2004). 
2In this paper, I show that unretirement transitions are not infrequent. In the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), 26 percent of retirees reverse their retirement decision, and as many as 
35 percent of the youngest retirees do so.  To help interpret these data, I offer a simple life cycle 
model of retirement that generates optimal unretirement by two mechanisms: 1) uncertainty in 
asset returns, healthcare expenses, and wage offers; and 2) a phenomenon I call “burnout and 
recovery” in which individuals predictably “burn out” on work, retire, and “recover.”  I use this 
framework to guide a set of reduced form analyses designed to test whether unretirement 
transitions were mostly expected or unexpected as of the period before retirement.   
Drawing on unique expectations data in the HRS, I show that 82 percent of those later 
observed to unretire expected to work during retirement.  I reinforce this finding by showing that 
information known prior to retirement predicts subsequent unretirement nearly as well as ex-ante 
and ex-post information combined.  For the small minority of unretirees who deviated from their 
pre-retirement expectation of not working, there is little evidence that financial shocks played a 
significant role.  If anything, my results point to preference shocks—some individuals apparently 
found retirement less satisfying than anticipated.  Perhaps surprisingly, unfulfilled work 
expectations were much more common than unfulfilled leisure expectations.  In this regard, the 
evidence points to two causal factors:  the arrival of positive news about financial position at 
retirement for some and the arrival of negative news about health (i.e., health shocks) for others.
Finally, I show that unretirement is quite similar to partial retirement both in terms of the 
jobs held and the characteristics of the individuals who choose these non-traditional retirement 
paths.  The prevalence of unretirement, as well as partial retirement, underscores the rising 
importance of multi-stage retirement transitions.  I offer the burnout/recovery hypothesis as a 
starting point for allowing unretirement transitions to arise not only through uncertain 
3realizations of the budget constraint in structural life cycle models, but also through dynamic 
preferences for leisure.
2. The Empirical Importance of Unretirement 
2.1  Definitions of Retirement and Unretirement 
I define the states of full and partial retirement on the basis of hours worked. I then refine 
these classifications using self-assessed retirement status in order to distinguish the unemployed 
and disabled from the retired, and part-time workers from the partially retired.
2  Specifically, an 
individual is classified as fully retired if 1) he reports not working for pay; and 2) he describes 
himself as retired.  If he makes no mention of retirement, he is considered unemployed, disabled 
or not in the labor force.  An individual is classified as partially retired if 1) she reports working 
for pay; 2) she works part-time (defined as working fewer than 35 hours per week or fewer than 
36 weeks per year); and 3) she describes herself as retired.  If she makes no mention of 
retirement, then she is classified as working part-time, rather than partially retired.  Unretirement 
is defined as any of three possible transitions: 1) full retirement to full-time employment; 2) full 
retirement to partial retirement/part-time employment; and 3) partial retirement to full-time 
employment.  It is also useful to distinguish partial retirement transitions which here refer to 
direct transitions from full-time work to partial retirement. Transitions are identified on the basis 
of wave-to-wave changes in labor force status, and the associated transition dates reported by 
respondents are carefully recorded.
3  The Data Appendix discusses additional issues associated 
2 For example, only 64 percent of those who were not working for pay in Wave 2 also said they were retired; the 
remaining 36 percent said they were unemployed, disabled, or “not in the labor force.”  Although the fraction of 
nonworkers who say they are retired grows over time, even by Wave 6, only 87 percent of nonworkers say they 
are retired. 
3 As Blau (1994) has noted, wave-to-wave transition measures miss short unretirement spells that occur between 
waves, and whose importance is debatable.  Using the detailed between-wave job history information to identify 
short unretirement spells in the HRS, I found that while about five percent of retirees re-enter and exit the labor 
force between waves, their spells were of very short duration and associated with extremely low annual earnings.  
4with identifying transitions, provides details about the procedure used to impute missing 
transition dates, and describes sample restrictions. 
2.2  An Overview of Retirement Paths 
I start with an overview of the different retirement paths followed by the original HRS 
cohort members (b. 1931-1941) and their spouses, who were first interviewed in 1992 and re-
interviewed every other year through 2002.  Table 1 shows the retirement paths chosen by HRS 
respondents who first retired after 1992 and who are observed for at least six years following 
their first retirement.  Row 1 shows that 52.2 percent of retirees transitioned from work to full 
retirement and remained fully retired during the following six or more years.  This suggests that 
retirement is an absorbing state for only half of retirees, whereas the other half takes a path 
involving partial retirement and/or unretirement.  Rows 2 and 3 show that 12.9 percent of retirees 
fully retired then later returned to part-time work, whereas about half as many (6.3 percent) 
returned to full-time work after fully retiring.  Another 7.2 percent (row 6) initially partially 
retired then resumed full-time work.  Summing rows 2, 3, and 6 yields a total of 26.4 percent of 
retirees who ever unretired following their initial retirement.  As a group, they constitute over 
half of those who follow a non-traditional retirement path. 
Table 1 also illustrates the empirical importance of partial retirement. Some 28.6 percent 
of retirees transitioned directly from work to partial retirement,
4 whereas another 12.9 percent 
entered partial retirement after an initial spell of full retirement.  In total, 41.5 percent of retirees 
To avoid overstating the importance of unretirement, these very short spells are not included in the analysis. 
Additional details are given in the Data Appendix. 
4 About 5 percent of reported retirement transitions are from part-time work to partial retirement. While it is 
possible that these are true retirements, it is also possible that these represent response errors.  
5chose a retirement path involving a spell of partial retirement, which falls between Gustman and 
Steinmeier’s (1984b) estimate of one-third and Ruhm’s (1990) estimate of one-half.
5
2.3 Retirement Paths Featuring Unretirement
Table 2 shows the percent ever unretiring for the entire sample and various demographic 
subgroups, while varying the length of the post-retirement observation period.  The first column 
shows the percent who ever unretire without controlling for the observation period, whereas the 
second column restricts the sample to those observed at least one year after their initial 
retirement.  The figures are lower in the first column, reflecting a downward bias due to 
censoring: the denominator includes many recent retirees who have not yet had an opportunity to 
unretire.  The figures are highest in the last column, where the percent ever unretiring is 
computed for the subset of respondents observed the longest, at least six years after their first 
retirement.  Focusing on the last column, the first row shows that over a period of at least six 
years, 26.4 percent of retirees return to work.
6  This estimate is surprisingly close to Ruhm’s 
(1990) estimate of 25.4 percent in the older Retirement History Survey (RHS) cohort (b. 1905-
1911).
7  This is surprising given the two-decade difference between the cohorts, and would 
appear to suggest little change over time in the likelihood of unretirement; however, Ruhm’s 
estimate includes unemployed workers who transition to second careers at relatively young ages. 
Thus, if the definitions of retirement and unretirement used here were applied to Ruhm’s sample, 
5 Although the two papers use the same data; Ruhm’s definition of retirement is quite broad, potentially including 
transitions to second careers by individuals in their 40s.  In contrast, Gustman and Steinmeier consider only 
transitions to partial retirement from full-time jobs held at age 55.   
6 Note this is not an estimate of those who return to work after six years of retirement; rather it is an estimate of the 
percent ever unretiring among those who are observed for at least six years after retirement; they may have 
unretired at any time during the observation period. 
7 Ruhm reports unretirement estimates separately for the partially retired (26.1 percent) and fully retired (24.9 
percent). I have taken a weighted average of Ruhm’s separate estimates to construct a single estimate that is 
comparable to those presented here. 
6the estimated unretirement rate would likely be lower.
8  Blau (1994) examined quarterly 
employment transitions in the RHS panel and found that 25.7 percent of non-employment spells 
ended in re-entry, and similarly 22.6 percent of part-time employment spells ended in a transition 
to full-time work.  As with Ruhm’s analysis, transitions out of unemployment as well as 
retirement are included, implying that the percentage re-entering from retirement only would be 
lower.  Support for this assertion comes from Rust (1990), who tracked employment sequences 
over 10 years of RHS data and found that 19 percent of sequences involved re-entry after an 
initial self-report of retirement whereas 29 percent involved re-entry after a spell of either 
unemployment or self-reported retirement.   
Other estimates of unretirement rates in the literature are much smaller, owing primarily 
to the use of short observation periods, but also possibly to the fact that most were computed for 
older cohorts.  For example, Gustman and Steinmeier (1984a) estimated a 16.6 percent 
unretirement rate over a two-year period in the RHS; Berkovec and Stern (1991) reported one-
year unretirement rates ranging between 6.3 to 13.2 percent depending on age in the National 
Longitudinal Study of Older Men (NLS);
9 Diamond and Hausman (1984) reported two-year re-
entry rates of retired workers in the NLS of 9.6 to 17.6 percent depending on age; and Benitez-
Silva (2003) found that about 12.6 percent of nonworkers (not necessarily retirees) in the HRS 
re-entered the labor force within 24 months.
Table 2 also reveals some variation in unretirement patterns by demographic 
characteristics. Men are much more likely to ever unretire than women, and Hispanics are least 
likely to unretire compared to blacks and whites, who are similar in this respect.  The likelihood 
8 The observation periods underlying the two sets of estimates are similar.  Ruhm’s estimates are based on an 8-year 
observation period following first retirement, whereas mine are based on an average observation period of 7.7 
years (a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 10 years).  
9 The NLS cohort was born during 1907-21 and thus mostly lies between the RHS and HRS cohorts. 
7of ever unretiring does not vary by education, which signals that unretirement may not be 
strongly correlated with low wealth accumulation or poor planning.   
The most striking differences arise with respect to age of first retirement.  Those retiring 
in their early 50’s are quite likely to ever return to work; this likelihood declines for those who 
first retire in their late 50’s, then flattens out for those who first retire in their early 60s.
10   There 
is some evidence of a spike in the likelihood of ever unretiring for those first retiring at age 63, 
but this likely reflects sampling variability.
11  One explanation for the high unretirement rates 
among early retirees is the interaction between employer defined benefit pension incentives, 
legal impediments to claiming a pension while remaining a regular salaried employee, and 
employer minimum hours requirements.  Those incentivized to begin claiming their pension at 
the plan’s early retirement age must also separate from their jobs, and if they wish to continue 
doing paid work, must generally seek employment elsewhere.
12
2.4 Unretirement Hazard Rates
It is also of interest to know how quickly retirees return to the workforce following 
retirement.  Figures 2a and 2b show nonparametric unretirement hazard rates by gender, and by 
first retirement age.  The unretirement hazard rate is the probability of returning to work (or 
increasing labor supply in the case of partial retirement) conditional on having retired and not yet 
returned to work.
13  For both men and women, the unretirement hazard initially rises steeply, 
peaks two years following retirement, then steadily declines.  The hazard rate is everywhere 
10 An age gradient was also noted by Berkovec and Stern (1991) in the older NLS cohort, with Ruhm (1990) in the 
RHS cohort, and with Benitez-Silva (2000) in the HRS cohort. 
11 Because the HRS panel starts out relatively young (ages 51-61), only small numbers of respondents are observed 
for several years following a first retirement at age 63 or later. 
12 In the U.S., it is not legal for an individual to be simultaneously a regular employee and pensioner of the same 
firm unless they have reached their pension plan’s normal retirement age.  
13 The hazard is shown in continuous time since actual dates (month and year) of retirement and unretirement are 
used instead of discrete two-year intervals based only on reported status at each survey wave.   
8higher for men. The declining hazard is suggestive of both state dependence and unobserved 
heterogeneity.  For example, the longer a retiree has been out of the workforce, the more his 
human capital may depreciate, or it could be that those out of the workforce longer have 
relatively high marginal values of leisure or low returns to work.  Most importantly, the 
declining profiles suggest that unretirement is not predominantly a response to financial shocks, 
since if this were the case we might expect a flat profile over time.
14
In contrast, the patterns by age of first retirement are quite varied.  For those retiring in 
their early 50s, the hazard rate is notably elevated during the first five years following retirement 
then declines, suggesting a somewhat different retirement process for the youngest retirees.  In 
particular, retirees in their early 50s are about 20 percent more likely than older retirees to have 
retired involuntarily and thus may maintain interest in returning to the labor force for a longer 
period following retirement than do older retirees.  Also of note is that the unretirement hazard 
following retirement at ages 62-64 is lower than the hazard following retirement at ages 65 and 
older in the first three years. This could reflect heterogeneity in preferences for work, but may 
also in part reflect the elimination of the Social Security earnings test at the normal retirement 
age beginning in 2000.
15
3. A Retirement Model with “Burnout and Recovery”
3.1 Theoretical Model 
I next present a model of retirement that shows how both expected and unexpected 
unretirement transitions might arise.  Suppose that in each period t=1,2,…,T, an individual’s 
14 This pattern does not rule out all financial shocks, since it could be consistent with informational shocks arising 
shortly after retirement as individuals become aware of their true state of retirement preparedness. 
15 The earnings test was maintained between ages 62 and the normal retirement age, and eliminated thereafter.  The 
normal retirement age increases with year of birth for cohorts born after 1937 and before 1960.   
9utility depends on consumption   and hours worked  , which is defined discretely to reflect 
minimum hours constraints.  Let the within-period utility function take the form:  
t c t h
1 1 1
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1
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An individual’s time endowment is normalized to 1, such that (1 ) t h   is the amount of 
leisure consumed,  ( ) t g I  is a “burnout/recovery” function that affects the marginal utility of 
leisure in every period, and  '( ) 0 t g I ! .  The variable   is a time-varying work history variable, 
such as the percent of the last 30 years worked by the individual.  With each additional year of 
work,  rises and since 
t g
t g '( ) 0 t g I ! , “burnout” also rises.  After retirement,   steadily declines 
and “recovery” occurs.  If at some point the individual returns to work,   begins to rise again 
and so does burnout.  The burnout/recovery function can also include other variables that shift 
the marginal utility of leisure up or down such as health status, or even unobserved 
heterogeneity.  The addition of the burnout/recovery function distinguishes this model from 
those in the retirement literature, which have primarily allowed reverse transitions to arise 




The dynamic program for the individual is given by the Bellman equation 
1 max[ ( | , )],
t
tt t t t
d
VU E V d GS    : t        ( 2 )  
where G  is a subjective discount factor, S  is the probability of survival from t to t+1, and 
is a vector of optimal choices over consumption and hours worked, which is 
conditioned on information known at time t,
() t dd  : t
t : .
10  The individual maximizes the Bellman equation subject to the period budget constraint: 
1 (1 ) ( , , ) ( , , ) tt t t t t t t tt t t t t t a a r wh db g q age ss g h age y c m         t    (3) 
where is financial assets in period t (which could include DC pension assets); is a 
stochastic real interest rate;  is the hourly wage;  is the value of DB pension payments, 
which depend on work history, age and whether the individual has separated from a job 
providing DB pension coverage (1
t a t r
t w t db
) t q   ; is the value of social security benefit payments, 
which are a function of work history, age and hours worked in accordance with eligibility rules 
and the Social Security earnings test,  is stochastic healthcare expenses, which could include 
out-of-pocket expenses as well as insurance premiums; and
t ss
t m
t y is other income, which could 
include transfers, spousal earnings and spousal pension payments.  Finally, post-retirement job 
offers are not received with perfect certainty and wages are randomly distributed; that is, 
although a retiree may want or need a job, he may not receive a wage offer that exceeds his 
reservation wage.  Individuals receive a wage offer in every period with probability p .
3.2 Graphical Illustration 
The top panel of Figure 1 shows how burnout and recovery can lead to optimal 
unretirement.  As individuals accrue many sequential years in the labor force, they grow steadily 
(and predictably) tired of working (i.e., burned out).  Eventually, their marginal value of leisure 
surpasses the marginal benefit from continued work, and they retire (point r1).  But once they 
retire, recovery sets in.  As they accumulate months of leisure, the marginal value of leisure 
declines; if it falls below the marginal benefit of work, they may again choose to work (point w).
In this example, recovery occurs over time; however, if recovery were instantaneous, the 
individual would transition directly to a new job (e.g., partial retirement).  The marginal utility of 
11leisure could theoretically fluctuate with repeated episodes of labor force participation but at 
some point the individual becomes permanently burned out, and recovery is not possible. This 
could occur when the individual becomes too old, too sick, or tired of work. Because entry and 
exit are driven by the marginal value of leisure relative to the return to work, this framework 
accommodates non-wage aspects of jobs that affect the utility of work. 
The bottom panel shows how uncertainty can interact with burnout and recovery.  Because 
the marginal benefit of work is affected by stochastic realizations of asset returns ( ), healthcare 
expenses ( ), and the probability of receiving a post-retirement wage offer (
t r
t m p ) greater than the 
reservation wage, it can shift up or down in any period.  In the picture, I suppose the individual 
receives a shock which shifts the marginal benefit of work up in the period following retirement, 
causing it to exceed the marginal utility of leisure at that point, which induces the individual to 
re-enter the labor force sooner than in the absence of the shock. If instead the shock causes the 
marginal benefit curve to shift downward, and is sufficiently large, it is possible that during the 
recovery phase the marginal utility of leisure never declines enough to induce the individual to 
return to work.  In this case, retirement becomes an absorbing state. 
To summarize, the model shows how burnout and recovery can generate predictable 
unretirement transitions (as well as partial retirement transitions), whereas uncertainty can 
generate unexpected transitions (or more precisely, departures from the expected labor supply 
path).  Predictable transitions can also be the result of variables that evolve in a predetermined 
fashion, such as temporary work disincentives created by the Social Security earnings test or 
private pension programs.  Furthermore, burnout and recovery interact with uncertainty; an 
individual who expected to unretire after sufficient recovery might not if a shock reduces the 
marginal benefit of work, and someone who thought no amount of recovery could ever make 
12work attractive again might be induced to unretire by an unexpectedly high wage offer that raises 
the return to work.  Similarly, if we allow uncertainty in preferences for retirement leisure, those 
who find retirement less satisfying than expected would experience an unexpected drop in the 
marginal utility of leisure that may be sufficient to induce some to return to work. 
The model suggests a simple way of testing whether stochastic events are an important 
impetus of unretirement.  If an individual’s expectation of work after retirement equals his 
realization, i.e., if 1, (| ) tt t t t 1 E Vd V  :   , then it must be true that no new information arrived that 
caused the individual to revise his plan.  In this case, knowledge of  t : and  accurately predict 
whether the individual will unretire at t+1.  If on the other hand,
t d
1, (| ) tt t t t 1 E Vd V   :z, then the 
individual must have received new information which caused him to revise his plan, and  t : and
are not good predictors of whether he or she will unretire at t+1.  In the sections that follow, I 
use elicited expectations combined with subsequent realizations to assess the extent to which 
expectations match realizations.  
t d
4. Expectations and Realizations of Work after Retirement 
4.1 Do Expectations Match Realizations? 
At their baseline interview in 1992, working respondents were asked the following 
question about their expectations of work during retirement: “Some people want to stop paid 
work entirely when they retire, while others would like to continue doing some paid work. What 
about you?”  A simple test of whether unretirement transitions are planned or a response to 
shocks is to tabulate responses to this question among those later observed to unretire. Strikingly, 
I find that 81.7 percent of eventual unretirees said they expected to work during retirement.  The 
figure is identical (81.7) among eventual partial retirees, underscoring the similarity of the two 
13retirement paths.  In short, this piece of evidence strongly suggests that the vast majority of 
unretirement transitions were intended prior to retirement, just like partial retirement transitions.  
For comparison, 62.4 percent of those who did not work during retirement (either unretirement 
or partial retirement) said they expected to work (T-stat for difference = -8.0).  Although this 
expectation is significantly lower than that of those who did work, it is still somewhat high and 
raises the question of how well expectations match realizations generally, without conditioning 
upon realizations of a particular type. 
To address this question, I construct a categorical measure of accuracy by subtracting an 
indicator variable for whether the respondent expected to work from an indicator variable for 
whether the respondent realized work.  I count both partial retirement and unretirement as work 
realizations since the expectations question does not distinguish one from the other. Values of 
 indicate “pessimistic” expectations (the individual expected to work but did not in fact do 
so), values of 0 indicate “accurate” expectations, and values of 1 indicate “optimistic” 
expectations (the individual expected not to work but in fact did so).
1 
16  At the individual level 
inaccurate expectations do not necessarily imply irrational behavior; expectations need not be 
equal to realizations if the state variables upon which the expectations were based have 
changed.
17   Rather we can use the presence and type of forecast errors to infer the extent to 
which unexpected information has arrived in the period between expectation and realization, and 
whether this new information is predominantly positive or negative.  
16 In applying the labels “pessimistic” and “optimistic,” I adopt the conventional perspective that individuals receive 
disutility from work; however, if work after retirement is instead utility enhancing, the labels could be reversed.  
17 Because the work expectations survey question requires a yes-no answer, it is somewhat of a crude measure; 
those who expect to work with a probability between 0 and 1 are forced to choose an extreme value.  This means 
that testing for rational expectations at the aggregate level could be hampered by the imprecision with which 
expectations are elicited. 
14The first row of Table 3 shows the percent of retirees whose work expectations were 
optimistic, pessimistic or accurate.  Remarkably, over half the sample (55.2 percent) reported 
accurate expectations. About one-third (37.3 percent) of retirees were pessimistic (they thought 
they would work but in fact did not), whereas just 7.5 percent were optimistic (they thought they 
would not work but in fact did).
18  Based on the model in Section 3, I interpret this pattern to 
suggest that the majority of respondents did not experience an economic or informational shock 
after retirement sufficient to cause a revision of their pre-retirement plans.  Of the remaining 44.8 
percent who did receive new information, the pattern suggests that if the shocks were financial in 
nature, they were predominantly positive.  Indeed, 83 percent of this group (37.3/44.8) received 
information that caused them to depart from their pre-retirement plan of working.  Examples 
might include news of unexpected investment gains, or the realization that retirement resources 
were more than adequate to meet retirement needs.  However, the pattern is also consistent with 
the onset of health shocks that may have prevented some from executing their work plans, and 
which may or may not have had financial implications depending on insurance coverage.
19
Of the minority who received information after retirement causing them to re-optimize in favor 
of work, some may have received negative financial information, but it is also possible that they 
simply received an unexpected job offer that exceeded their reservation wage.   
To help sort among these potential explanations, Table 3 also compares wealth and health 
changes for respondents in each group.  The median individual with pessimistic expectations 
experienced a pre-/post-retirement change in net worth of 4.4 percent, whereas the median 
18 In order to boost the number of observations in the optimistic group, the sample used for this table is all retirees 
observed two or more years after their first retirement. 
19 It is also possible that some of this group searched for and failed to attain jobs, which would be a negative 
financial shock of a different sort.   
15individual with optimistic expectations experienced no change in net worth.  Wealth changes at 
the 75
th percentile were also larger for the pessimistic group than for the optimistic group.   
A natural explanation for this pattern is the unprecedented performance of the stock 
market during my sample period.
20  In their study of consumption changes at retirement, 
Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy (2002) found that households expected sharper decreases in 
consumption than were actually realized, and the authors attributed much of the gap between 
expectations and realizations to stock market participation.
21  However, the HRS data do not 
point to unexpected stock market gains as an important reason for unfulfilled work expectations. 
The median person in all groups experienced no change in the value of stockholdings, which for 
the median person were zero before and after retirement, and at the 75
th percentile, the gains in 
stock value are highest for the optimistic group, not the pessimistic group.  This pattern suggests 
two findings: 1) the receipt of positive stock market news is not a principle reason for unfulfilled 
work expectations and 2) the receipt of negative stock market news is not a principle reason for 
unplanned unretirements.   
Additional insight can be gained by comparing respondents’ ex-ante and ex-post 
perceptions about retirement.  Prior to retirement, respondents were asked whether they were 
worried about “not having enough income to get by” during retirement or about “not doing 
anything productive or useful” during retirement.
22  Retired respondents were asked a follow-up 
20 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the economic expansion of the 1990’s began in March 
1991 and ended in March 2001 (Hall et al., 2001).   
21 Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy (2002) analyzed data for TIAA-CREF participants in January 2000 and January 2001. 
22 In Waves 1-3, respondents who did not report being completely retired were asked: “Now for things that some 
people say are bad about retirement. Please tell me if they worry you a lot, somewhat, a little, or not at all: Not 
having enough income to get by.” Also listed was “Not doing anything productive or useful.” In wave 1, the first 
part of the question was slightly different: “Now for things that worry some people about retirement.  Please tell 
me …” 
16question asking if they were actually bothered by not having enough income or not being 
productive.
23  This information is available for respondents who retired between 1992 and 1996. 
From Table 3, it is immediately evident that the pessimistic group was more prone to ex-
ante worrying than the optimistic group.  For example, 59.6 percent of the pessimistic group 
worried about income (a lot or somewhat) compared to just 35.3 percent of the optimistic group.  
Similarly, 35.9 percent of the pessimistic group worried about not being productive compared to 
20.4.  Worries about income declined significantly after retirement for the pessimistic group, 
suggesting that realized retirement turned out better than expected, at least as far as finances 
were concerned.
24  In contrast, ex-post worries about retirement income rose slightly (though not 
significantly) among the optimistic group.  The pattern is reversed for worries about not being 
productive.  There was little change in the percent worried ex-ante and ex-post among the 
pessimistic group, but a substantial increase in worries about not being productive among the 
optimistic group (from 20.4 to 34.7 percent).  This suggests that the dominant explanation for 
unplanned unretirements may be preference shocks, not income shocks.   
Health-related changes are also an important part of the picture.  Individuals in the 
pessimistic group were more likely to experience a health shock (26.7) than the optimistic group 
(19.8), which suggests that realized health plays an important role in facilitating the fulfillment 
of work expectations after retirement.  In contrast, unexpected medical expenses of a family 
member do not appear to be associated with unplanned unretirement, as married respondents in 
all groups were just as likely to have a spouse who experienced a health shock.  Nonetheless, 
23 In Waves 1-3, retired respondents were asked a variant of the same question: “Now for things that some people 
say are bad about retirement. Please tell me if, during your retirement, they have bothered you a lot, somewhat, a 
little, or not at all: Not having enough income to get by.” Also listed was “Not doing anything productive or 
useful.” 
24 Such an interpretation is not without precedence:  Mastrogiacomo (2003) found that older Dutch households were 
overly pessimistic about their financial situation in comparisons of ex-ante expectations and ex-post realizations. 
17optimistic individuals were more likely to become uninsured after retirement, suggesting that 
changes in medical expense risk may be an important motivation for unplanned unretirement, as 
long as the changes in risk were unexpected.
25
On balance, the expectations data suggest four key findings:  1) most unretirements were 
planned prior to retirement; 2) when realizations diverged from prior expectations, individuals 
were more likely to have been too pessimistic (expecting to work but not in fact working) rather 
than too optimistic (expecting not to work but in fact working);  3) among those who were too 
pessimistic, the evidence points to the arrival of positive news about financial position after 
retirement (though not driven by the stock market gains) and/or negative news about health; 4) 
among the small minority who were too optimistic, the evidence points to the arrival of negative 
news about preferences for retirement leisure, rather than negative news about financial position; 
one possible exception is that loss of health insurance coverage may have prompted some to 
return to work.
4.2 The Predictability of Unretirement
The model in Section 3 suggests another way of testing whether unretirement transitions 
are mostly anticipated or unanticipated.  If anticipated, then in a model explaining unretirement, 
variables describing the post-retirement information set should add little predictive power once 
variables describing the pre-retirement information set are included.  The same should be true in 
a model of partial retirement, since the partial retirement transition is made prior to realization of 
the post-retirement information set.  Thus, the partial retirement case offers a useful benchmark 
against which to judge the case of unretirement.  
25 This would be true if an individual unexpectedly lost health insurance, but could also be true for someone who 
changed health insurance plans and was not fully aware of the resulting changes in expected out-of-pocket 
expenses.  Even for someone who did not lose or change health insurance, medical expenditure risk could change 
if the individual experienced a health shock associated with large out-or-pocket expenses.  
18These insights suggest a straightforward estimation framework to test the predictability of 
unretirement.  I adopt the perspective that individuals first decide whether to retire, then 
conditional upon the decision to leave their jobs, they select one of three retirement paths:  retire 
fully and never return to work, transition directly to a part-time job (partial retirement) then retire 
fully, or take a break from work and return at a later point (unretirement).  This perspective 
readily translates to a multinomial logit model over choices defined by full retirement, partial 
retirement and unretirement, and can be estimated for those observed to retire.
26  I assess the 
relative importance of the pre- and post-retirement information sets by first estimating the model 
of retirement path choice using only pre-retirement information, then re-estimating the model 
with both the pre- and post-retirement information sets.
27  Specifically, if r denotes individual i’s
retirement date, then let r-1 denote the survey wave prior to retirement and r+1 the survey wave 
after retirement.  Individual i chooses retirement path i y k    , where  1, 2,3 k   , at time r
conditional upon the pre-retirement information set  ,1 ir X  with probability:   
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26 In principle one could estimate a more general model in which the choice of whether to retire in any given period 
is also modeled.  That route is not pursued here for two reasons: 1) the concept of a pre- and post-retirement 
information set is not well defined for an individual who has not yet retired, and 2) the framework adopted here is 
sufficient to perform the analyses of interest.  
27 In neither model does a generalized Hausman test reject IIA.  
19If the retirement path choice is indeed made at time r, then information available at r+1, should 
have little effect on the choice of retirement path.  If, on the other hand, individuals revise their 
initial retirement path choice as new information arrives, then information available at r+1 may 
affect the retirement path choice, which would be more appropriately characterized as a series of 
sequential choices rather than a single decision.  This is simply a test of whether the  ,1 kr E  are
equal to zero.  Another convenient aspect of this approach is that it is easy to test 
whether kj E E    for k j z ; in other words, I can assess the degree of similarity between the 
partial retirement and unretirement paths.  
Model 1 of Table 4 shows multinomial logit coefficients for the partial retirement and 
unretirement path choices, considering only pre-retirement information.  The reference group is 
full retirement.  Descriptive statistics for all variables included in the model are shown in 
Appendix Table 1.  Beginning with pre-retirement demographics and health status, age at first 
retirement enters as a linear function interacted with a dummy for first retirement age equal to 62 
in order to allow the intercept and slope of the retirement age profile to change at the Social 
Security early retirement age.  For those first retiring prior to age 62, the relative probability of 
selecting the unretirement path declines as retirement age rises, whereas the relative likelihood of 
choosing partial retirement is not statistically significant. For those retiring at age 62, there is a 
discrete drop in the probability of choosing partial retirement over full retirement (though not 
precisely estimated), and a rise in the likelihood of choosing unretirement (also imprecise).  
Although the pattern is not strong, it suggests a binding SSA retirement earnings test at age 62 
for at least some individuals:  those who favor continued work may substitute away from partial 
20retirement as the penalty for partial retirement rises at age 62.
28  For those first retiring after age 
62, the retirement age coefficients are imprecisely estimated, although they suggest that the 
relative probability of partial retirement declines in retirement age.  
With regard to other demographic characteristics, men are more likely than women to 
choose partial retirement or unretirement over full retirement. Blacks are significantly less likely 
to choose partial retirement but more likely to choose unretirement, whereas the reverse is true of 
whites.  Marital status and education have no detectable effect on either choice.  Both partial 
retirement and unretirement are less likely for those in fair or poor self-reported health before 
retirement.   
If unretirement arises because of negative financial shocks, greater retirement resources 
should have a protective effect, reducing the probability of unretirement.  Surprisingly, pre-
retirement (log) income is weakly positively associated with both partial retirement and 
unretirement, contrary to what one would expect if work after retirement were predominantly 
associated with low socio-economic status.  Net worth is negatively correlated with both partial 
retirement and unretirement but its coefficients are not statistically significant.  Those entitled to 
an employer-provided pension and/or retiree health insurance are significantly less likely to 
choose partial retirement over full retirement; however, this is not necessarily true for 
unretirement as the coefficients are smaller (quite a bit so for pension entitlement) and 
statistically insignificant.
29  This pattern points to the possibility that pension entitlement may 
facilitate the “recovery” phase for those who wish to take a break from working while they 
decide what to pursue next.  The patterns by occupational group also suggest a positive 
28 About 80 percent of retirees in my sample retired prior to 2000, when the SSA earnings test was eliminated at the 
full retirement age.  SSA withholds $1 in benefits for every $2 in earnings in excess of the exempt threshold, 
currently $12,060 (2007). 
29 In contrast, Ruhm (1990) and Benitez-Silva (2000) find that unretirement is less likely among pensioners, and 
Benitez-Silva (2000) also finds that labor force re-entry is less likely among those with health insurance. 
21correlation between unretirement and retirement resources.  Most notably, those in 
managerial/professional specialty or precision production/craft/repair occupations before 
retirement are significantly more likely to choose partial retirement or unretirement than are 
operators and laborers (the reference group), or those in service occupations.
Turning next to pre-retirement financial planning, perceptions about retirement, and work 
expectations, respondents with a short financial planning horizon (the next few months or next 
year) were no more likely to choose partial retirement or unretirement over full retirement, 
suggesting that choosing a retirement path that involves work after retirement is not related to 
inadequate retirement planning.  Similarly, those who reported in the period prior to retirement 
that they were worried about having enough income during retirement were no more likely to 
choose partial retirement or unretirement.  On the other hand, pre-retirement expectations of 
work during retirement are highly predictive of choosing partial retirement or unretirement over 
full retirement.  If partial retirement were for planners and unretirement for those who 
experienced shocks, the expectations variable should be more predictive of partial retirement and 
less predictive of unretirement, but this is not the case.  Exponentiating the logit coefficients to 
obtain the relative probabilities reveals that partial retirement and unretirement are respectively 
260 and 273 percent more likely than full retirement if the individual said they expected to work 
during retirement.  The estimated coefficients are highly significant, with t-statistics of 6.1 and 
5.4, respectively.  The implied marginal effects (not shown) indicate that an affirmative work 
expectation increases the probability of unretirement by 9 percentage points or 50 percent, and 
the probability of partial retirement by 12 percentage points or 44 percent.
A Hausman test of equality between the full sets of coefficients for partial retirement and 
unretirement indicates that their magnitudes are statistically different; however in most cases the 
22coefficient estimates point to qualitatively similar effects.  Indeed, it does not appear that the pre-
retirement information set is more predictive of partial retirement than unretirement, suggesting 
that unretirement and partial retirement are more alike than not.   
Model 2 of Table 4 adds elements of the post-retirement information set, specifically 
variables measuring changes in net worth, health, medical expenses, and health insurance, 
measured between the waves preceding and following retirement.  It is impossible to identify 
whether the changes were anticipated or unanticipated by respondents, however, some 
component of the variation will certainly reflect unanticipated changes.  The test applied here is 
two-fold:  If unretirement is a response to financial information received after retirement, then 
the addition of such variables should add predictive power to the model.  Moreover, the variables 
should primarily affect the choice of unretirement rather than partial retirement, since partial 
retirement here is by definition chosen at the time of retirement.  
Owing to measurement error in net worth, stockholdings, and medical expenses, I use 
dummy variables indicating large changes of 25 percent or more.  The coefficient estimates 
reveal that conditional upon choosing to retire, there is no relationship between retirement path 
choice and experiencing a 25 percent or greater drop in (non-housing) net worth or stock 
holdings, a 25 percent or greater increase in out-of-pocket medical expenses, or losing health 
insurance.  For partial retirement, this is the expected outcome since partial retirement transitions 
are determined at the time of retirement; on the other hand, the intention to unretire may be 
formed either at the time of retirement, or at some later time after the revelation of post-
retirement information.   The evidence suggests that the former is the dominant explanation; 
post-retirement financial information has little effect on the choice of unretirement over either 
full retirement or partial retirement.  Although it cannot be said to what extent these changes 
23were unanticipated, these results casts further doubt on the hypothesis that unretirement is 
primarily a response to financial shocks.   
As indicated by the expectations data in Table 3, changes in perceptions about retirement 
income and being productive during retirement play an intriguing role.  Becoming more or less 
worried about income after retirement has no impact on the choice of unretirement relative to full 
retirement, whereas becoming more bothered by not being productive significantly increases the 
probability of unretirement.  In contrast, becoming more worried about income significantly 
raises the probability of partial retirement, whereas becoming less worried significantly lowers 
the probability of partial retirement.  The fact that these changes affect the partial retirement 
decision, suggests some slippage in the timing of the underlying shifts in perceptions relative to 
the timing of the retirement transition.  Changes in perceptions about productivity have no 
impact on the probability of partial retirement. 
Experiencing a health shock (a change in the number of chronic disease conditions ever 
had) renders both partial retirement and unretirement statistically less likely by a similar 
magnitude.  This could explain why individuals do not appear to increase labor supply to pay for 
medical bills; the health shock that causes the rise in out-of-pocket spending may limit work 
capability.  It is surprising that a post-retirement health shock would affect the retirement 
decision, but one potential explanation is that the health shock measure is correlated with 
unobservable aspects of pre-retirement health.  A second explanation is that some measured 
health shocks may actually precede the partial retirement transition because the dates of health 
shocks are unknown; in the absence of dating, it is impossible to know whether a given health 
shock occurred before or after retirement.  This is not the case for unretirement transitions since 
they occur later. 
24Although the elements of the post-retirement information set do not individually affect 
the choice of retirement path, they may in combination.  Indeed, the likelihood function declines 
(from -1716 to -1654) and the Pseudo R
2 rises with the addition of the post-retirement 
information set; a formal Likelihood Ratio Test confirms that Model 2 is statistically preferred.  
However, in terms of the model’s ability to correctly predict observed outcomes, little is gained.  
Excluding the post-retirement information set, the model predicts 52 percent of observations 
correctly.  Including the post-retirement information set, the model predicts 54 percent correctly.
In sum, the models offer little support for the hypothesis that unretirement is 
predominantly a response to financial shocks, however there is some evidence that shocks to 
preferences for retirement leisure (e.g., discovering retirement to be less enjoyable than 
expected) cause some to return to the labor force.  Although interesting, shocks of this nature are 
clearly of less concern from the perspective of policy.  Rather, the substantial predictive power 
of work expectations confirms that most individuals have formed their intentions about partial 
retirement and unretirement prior to retiring.  If anything, work expectations are more likely to 
go unfulfilled than leisure expectations.  In fact, positive financial news and negative health 
shocks play central roles in preventing some from fulfilling their post-retirement work 
expectations.
5. Characteristics of Post-Retirement Jobs 
The preceding analyses point to a similarity between partial retirement and unretirement 
in terms of the characteristics and motivation of people who choose these retirement paths. In 
this final section, I examine the extent to which the jobs themselves are similar. Table 5 presents 
a comparison of the characteristics of pre-retirement, partial retirement and unretirement jobs, 
where unretirement jobs are split by part-time or full-time.  Recall that by definition, partial 
25retirement jobs are part-time jobs.  Consistent with evidence from prior studies of bridge jobs, 
the median hourly wage on partial retirement ($10.32) and unretirement jobs ($8.35/$9.00) is 
significantly lower than the median wage earned on pre-retirement jobs ($15.45).  The lower 
wage associated with both part-time and full-time unretirement jobs relative to both partial 
retirement jobs and pre-retirement jobs could reflect loss of human capital associated with 
having left the labor force for a spell, or career changes.  The earnings “replacement rate” for 
post-retirement jobs relative to pre-retirement jobs is also shown for each job type.  At the 
median, partial retirement jobs replace about half of pre-retirement annual earnings, whereas 
full-time unretirement jobs replace a quarter and part-time unretirement jobs replace only 7.6 
percent.  Nonetheless, part-time unretirement jobs are similar to partial retirement jobs both in 
terms of average weekly hours and average weeks worked per year.
The need to maintain health insurance coverage may be an important motivation behind 
post-retirement employment.  Part-time unretirement jobs are least likely to offer health 
insurance coverage (35.5 percent), whereas nearly half of full-time unretirement jobs (48.3 
percent) offer health insurance coverage.  Partial retirement jobs are most similar to full-time 
unretirement jobs in this regard, but still the coverage rate is substantially lower than for pre-
retirement jobs (65.8 percent).  There are strong differences in self-reported job stress across 
types.  Not surprisingly, pre-retirement jobs are most stressful (62.7 percent), followed by full-
time unretirement jobs (40.1 percent), partial retirement jobs (33.9 percent), and part-time 
unretirement jobs (23.8 percent).  This pattern points to stress reduction as an important 
motivation for choosing a non-traditional retirement path among those who are not yet ready to 
leave the labor force permanently.  There are less obvious differences in physical requirements 
26across job types, though part-time positions (both partial retirement and part-time unretirement 
jobs) appear to be moderately less physically demanding.   
The distribution of jobs across industries is similar for partial retirement and unretirement 
jobs, and relative to pre-retirement jobs, there is a notable shift out of the manufacturing sector 
and into the services sector, especially for part-time positions.
30  Similarly, there is a parallel 
shift out of managerial/professional specialty occupations and into sales/admin support and 
services positions.  Finally, about 60 percent of unretirees changed occupations compared to just 
36 percent of partial retirees (not shown), and this is reflected in the fact that the occupational 
distribution of partial retirement jobs is more similar to the occupational distribution of pre-
retirement jobs.
31  If, as these figures suggest, partial retirement jobs are more closely related to 
the pre-retirement career than unretirement jobs, they may be easier to obtain without taking time 
out of the labor force to engage in search or skill building.  This could also explain the wage 
differential between the two types.
Finally, the duration of unretirement versus partial retirement jobs is also of interest.
Using a censored normal regression model of job tenure with no covariates to obtain an estimate 
of the uncensored mean job length yields an estimate of 4.6 years for partial retirement jobs and 
4.3 years for unretirement jobs.  Though not fully comparable, this estimate falls between 
Gustman and Steinmeier’s (1984a) estimate of about 3 years for time spent in partial retirement 
and Ruhm’s (1990) estimate of 5.2 years for time spent in partial retirement.    
In sum, the descriptive evidence suggests many similarities between unretirement and 
partial retirement jobs, but also interesting differences.  In particular, the data suggest that those 
who can find post-retirement jobs relatively easily transition directly to partial retirement, 
30 A similar shift was noted by Reimers and Honig (1993). 
31 These figures were calculated over disaggregated 3-digit industry and occupational codes rather than the 
aggregated categories shown in Table 4. 
27whereas those who must spend more time searching (or perhaps re-tooling of skills) pass through 
a period of retirement before starting their post-retirement jobs.  This is suggested by the fact that 
those who unretire are more likely to have changed occupations than those who transitioned 
directly to partial retirement.  In terms of the burnout-recovery model posited earlier, recovery 
may take longer for unretirees if their marginal disutility of work only declines with the prospect 
of doing something different, which may require time spent introspecting, doing research, or 
engaging in search. On the other hand, those who choose partial retirement may be content with 
their current occupation but desire fewer hours, in which case they “recover” immediately at the 
prospect of a new part-time job in their same occupation. 
6. Conclusions
Unretirement and partial retirement are empirically important phenomena. Nearly one-
half of retirees follow a nontraditional path that involves partial retirement and/or unretirement.  
Of retirees, 26.4 percent of those observed for at least six years after their first retirement return 
to work at some point during the interval, most commonly about two years after retirement. The 
unretirement rate is even higher among younger retirees (as high as 35 percent among those 
retiring at ages 53-54).
To help understand these facts, I offer a theoretical model that illustrates how 
unretirement transitions could arise either unexpectedly due to uncertainty in asset returns, 
medical expenses, or wage offers, or via preferences as individuals predictably “burn out” on 
their career jobs, retire, then re-enter the workforce after a period of “recovery.”  Using the 
model as guidance, the body of evidence presented in this paper strongly supports the hypothesis 
that unretirement transitions are mostly anticipated prior to retirement, and thus are not a 
28response to financial shocks experienced after retirement, or a result of poor planning or low 
wealth accumulation.
In support of this conclusion, I present four key pieces of evidence:  First, 82 percent of 
unretirement transitions were intended prior to retirement.  In support of this finding, I show that 
information received after retirement adds little explanatory power to a model of retirement path 
choice after controlling for information available prior to retirement.  In fact, the probability of 
unretirement is unresponsive to large declines in net worth or increases in out-of-pocket medical 
expenses occurring after retirement.  Second, comparing pre-retirement expectations with post-
retirement realizations of work, I find that when realizations diverged from expectations (in 
about 45 percent of cases), individuals were more likely to have been too pessimistic about 
retirement (expecting to work but not in fact working) rather than too optimistic (expecting not 
to work but in fact working).  Third, among those who were too pessimistic, the evidence points 
to the arrival of positive news about financial position after retirement (though not driven by the 
stock market gains) and/or negative news about health.  These results complement evidence from 
studies of consumption behavior that suggest actual retirement turns out better than expected for 
most people (Forni, 1999, Hurd and Rohwedder, 2003, Mastrogiacomo, 2003).  Fourth, among 
the small minority who were too optimistic, the evidence points to the arrival of negative news 
about preferences for retirement leisure, and not negative news about financial position; it 
appears that many individuals found retirement to be less satisfying than expected, especially 
with respect to being productive.  One possible exception is that loss of health insurance 
coverage may have prompted some to return to work, although it is likely that such losses were 
anticipated prior to retirement.   
29For most people, unretirement appears to represent an alternative retirement path, similar 
to partial retirement. The jobs held by unretirees share many of the same characteristics as the 
bridge jobs held by partial retirees, and there are few notable differences in the determinants of 
partial retirement and unretirement.     
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32Data Appendix 
Sample Definition 
I use the longitudinal structure of the HRS to carefully track and date respondents’ 
transitions in and out of the labor force over time.  My analysis sample is composed of members 
of the initial HRS cohort, who were first interviewed in 1992 when they were between the ages 
of 51 and 61, and their spouses.  Respondents are re-interviewed every two years; therefore the 
first six waves yield data over the period 1992 through 2002.  To be included in the sample, 
respondents must be present in at least the first two survey waves and working for pay (either 
full- or part-time) in Wave 1.  To reduce the risk of contaminating the sample with individuals 
whose retirement processes began prior to 1992, I drop those working respondents who in Wave 
1 also describe themselves as retired (either partially or fully) (2701 observations), or who later 
report a first retirement date that precedes their baseline interview in 1992 (301 observations). I 
drop 49 respondents who report retirement dates implying retirement ages younger than 50. My 
final sample size is 7,335 observations.   
Identifying Retirement/Unretirement Transitions 
Transitions between states are identified by wave-to-wave changes in respondents’ 
employment or retirement status according to the definitions described in Section 2.  When a 
transition is identified to have occurred between waves, the date (in months) of the transition 
given by the respondent is recorded.  When a respondent is observed to be retired in two 
sequential waves, it is assumed that no unretirement spell occurred.  In actuality, about five 
percent of retirees re-enter the labor force and exit between waves.  Although strictly speaking 
these are unretirement spells, analysis reveals that 50 percent of them last less than six months, 
and 75 percent last less than one year. Perhaps more relevant than their duration is that annual 
33earnings in the calendar year between interviews are zero for at least half of these respondents, 
and less than $2,000 for 75 percent of them.  The estimated prevalence of unretirement 
transitions would rise by about five percentage points (from 26 percent to 31 percent) if these 
short spells were included; however, given their somewhat trivial nature, I do not include them to 
avoid overstating the importance of unretirement.  Perhaps most importantly, the shape of the 
unretirement hazard is robust to their inclusion.  All results of the multinomial logit models are 
also robust to their inclusion, although standard errors are a bit larger in some instances, 
suggesting that the short spells mostly add noise rather than systematic variation.  
Procedure for Imputing Missing Retirement Dates 
When the respondent gave the year of retirement but not the month, I assumed the 
following: 1) if the individual retired in the same year as the interview, I imputed the month of 
retirement to be the midpoint between January 1 of that year and the ending date of the 
interview; 2) if the individual retired in the calendar year between the current and previous 
interviews, I assume the individual retired in June of the indicated year; 3) if the individual 
retired in the year of the previous interview (and did not report retirement at the previous 
interview), then I impute the month of retirement to be the midpoint between the ending date of 
the previous interview and December 31 of that year. Complete retirement dates for less than one 
percent of retired observations were constructed in this fashion.
When retired respondents failed to give either year or month of retirement, I attempted to 
use the date their last job ended from a different part of the survey, but valid data existed for only 
one observation. I also scanned later waves looking for a retirement date that fell between the 
interview date at which retirement was first reported and the date of the preceding interview, but 
34found no valid dates.
32 When neither the year of retirement nor the year the last job ended was 
available, I used the fact that the respondent must have retired at some point between the last 
survey wave (at which she reported herself to be working) and the current survey wave (at which 
she reports herself to be either partially or fully retired). In these cases, I chose the midpoint 
between the two interview dates as the imputed retirement date. Complete retirement dates for 
6.2 percent of retired observations were constructed in this way. 
Procedure for Imputing Missing Unretirement Dates 
I impute missing unretirement dates following the approach used to impute missing 
retirement dates. I first checked the previous wave and all later waves for a job start date that 
falls between the interview date at which unretirement was first reported and the prior interview 
(logically, unretirement must have occurred within this two year period). Valid unretirement 
dates were found for only 16 sample observations at this stage. For the remainder of missing 
dates, I imputed the unretirement date to be the midpoint between the interview date at which 
unretirement is first reported and the prior interview. Some 110 unretirement dates were imputed 
in this fashion.
32 I accept dates from later waves only if they rationalize the reported labor force pattern, since a date reported in a 
later wave may pertain to a second retirement following a period of unretirement. 
35Figure 1. A Model of Retirement with Burnout and Recovery 
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0 2 4 6 8
Years Since Retirement
Men WomenTable 1. Retirement Paths
1.  Any Work --> Full Retirement --> Full Retirement 52.2
2.  Any Work --> Full Retirement --> Part-Time Work 12.9
3.  Any Work --> Full Retirement --> Full-Time Work 6.3
4.  Any Work --> Partial Retirement --> Partial Retirement 7.7
5.  Any Work --> Partial Retirement --> Full Retirement 13.7
6.  Any Work --> Partial Retirement --> Full-Time Work 7.2
Number of observations 1092
Notes: Retirement path categories are mutually exclusive.  Sample is all respondents observed at least 6 years 
after their first retirement. Any work refers to either part-time or full-time work.Table 2. Percent Ever Returning to Work Following Retirement
Post Retirement Observation Period
0+ Years 2+ Years 4+ Years 6+ Years
All 16.3 20.3 23.3 26.4
Gender
Men 17.9 22.9 26.5 31.2
Women 14.5 17.4 19.9 21.2
Race/Ethnicity
White 16.2 20.1 23.0 26.5
Black 16.4 20.5 25.1 27.1
Hispanic 18.5 23.6 24.6 23.8
Education
More than 12 Years 16.4 20.4 23.5 26.5
12 Years or Less 16.2 20.2 23.2 26.4
Retirement Status
Fully Retired 16.6 21.1 24.2 26.9
Partly Retired 15.5 18.0 20.8 25.3
Retirement Age
53-54 37.7 40.6 39.4 34.5
55-56 27.1 28.2 28.8 29.5
57-58 18.1 19.3 21.8 25.1
59-60 14.1 16.6 19.9 23.7
61-62 13.8 17.9 20.9 23.3
63-64 14.4 20.4 22.2 27.0
65-66 13.1 17.6 19.3 24.4
Notes:  Column headings denote alternate sample definitions in which respondents are observed for at least  2, 4 or 6 years after their first 
retirement.  The sample in the column labled "0+ years" includes all retired respondents, regardless of time since retirement.Table 3. Expectations and Realizations of Working in Retirement
Pessimistic Accurate Optimistic
Expectations Expectations Expectations
(Expected to Work but Didn't) (Didn't Expect to Work but Did)
Percent in Category 37.3 55.2 7.5
Wealth Changes Pre-/Post Retirement
Percent Change Net Worth (50th pctl) 4.4 4.6 0.0
Percent Change Net Worth (75th pctl) 56.8 48.4 41.4
Percent Change Stock Value (50th pctl) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Percent Change Stock Value (75th pctl) 0.7 51.5 55.9
Changes in Perceptions Pre/Post Retirement
Ex-Ante Worried about Not Having Enough Income 59.6 50.5 35.3
Ex-Post Bothered by Not Having Enough Income 42.5 39.7 39.4
Ex-Ante Worried about Not Being Productive 35.9 32.2 20.4
Ex-Post Bothered by Not Being Productive 32.4 31.3 34.7
Health-Related Changes Pre-/Post Retirement
Health Shock (Respondent) 26.7 19.1 19.8
Health Shock (Spouse if Married) 20.5 19.2 20.0
Lost Health Insurance Coverage 14.5 16.6 18.3
Notes: Sample is all individuals observed 2 or more years after first retirement.  Work after retirement includes partial retirement and unretirement.  Pre-/post 
retirement changes are measured using survey waves immediately before and after retirement date. Table 4. Multinomial Logit Model of Retirement Path Choice (Base Category=Full Retirement)
Model 1 Model 2
Partial Retirement Unretirement Partial Retirement Unretirement
Demographics & Health (Pre-Retirement)
Retirement Age-62 0.022 -0.065 0.040 -0.068
(0.030) (0.034) (0.031) (0.035)
Retirement Age>=62 -0.338 0.157 -0.349 0.195
(0.194) (0.227) (0.202) (0.229)
Retirement Age-62 x Retirement Age>=62 -0.089 0.027 -0.108 0.028
(0.097) (0.108) (0.101) (0.109)
Male 0.385 0.341 0.372 0.348
(0.142) (0.165) (0.148) (0.167)
Black -0.400 0.403 -0.347 0.421
(0.210) (0.202) (0.213) (0.208)
Hispanic -0.171 0.140 -0.230 0.086
(0.294) (0.325) (0.300) (0.334)
Other -0.423 -0.310 -0.585 -0.332
(0.474) (0.482) (0.535) (0.488)
Married 0.210 -0.020 0.230 -0.002
(0.172) (0.201) (0.180) (0.206)
Education <=12 years -0.250 0.102 -0.193 0.098
(0.147) (0.172) (0.151) (0.172)
Fair or Poor Health (Self-Reported) -0.532 -0.833 -0.276 -0.836
(0.207) (0.226) (0.222) (0.246)
Number of Health Conditions -0.036 -0.060 -0.070 -0.084
(0.063) (0.073) (0.065) (0.076)
Retirement Resources (Pre-Retirement)
Log Income 0.010 0.091 0.208 0.081
(0.043) (0.059) (0.071) (0.080)
ASINH Net Worth  -0.035 -0.012 -0.070 -0.010
(0.052) (0.059) (0.055) (0.062)
Self-Employed 0.658 0.313 0.485 0.296
(0.229) (0.281) (0.236) (0.285)
Employer Pension -0.537 -0.110 -0.642 -0.068
(0.181) (0.207) (0.189) (0.208)
Employer Offers Retiree Health Insurance -0.320 -0.216 -0.291 -0.185
(0.183) (0.217) (0.193) (0.227)
Occupation (Pre-Retirement)
Managerial/Professional Specialty 0.697 0.635 0.738 0.647
(0.238) (0.280) (0.248) (0.282)
Sales/Admin Support 0.563 0.442 0.578 0.456
(0.236) (0.280) (0.246) (0.281)
Services 0.337 0.323 0.397 0.386
(0.265) (0.306) (0.278) (0.308)
Precision Production/Craft/Repair 0.542 0.614 0.626 0.698
(0.257) (0.291) (0.268) (0.295)
Retirement Planning (Pre-Retirement)
Short Planning Horizon 0.052 0.147 0.050 0.126
(0.157) (0.172) (0.166) (0.174)
Plans to Keep Working in Retirement 0.955 1.004 0.936 0.998
(0.156) (0.186) (0.160) (0.187)
Worried About Not Having Enough Income -0.033 0.110 0.298 0.091
(0.140) (0.164) (0.168) (0.200)
Worried About Not Being Productive 0.033 0.117 0.114 0.267
(0.140) (0.162) (0.172) (0.199)
Changes in Resources & Perceptions  (Post-Retirement)
Net Worth (Non-Housing) Drops by 25% or More -0.069 -0.040
(0.154) (0.170)
Stock Value Drops by 25% or More 0.045 -0.036
(0.189) (0.205)
Became More Worried about Income 0.807 0.096
(0.276) (0.345)
Became Less Worried about Income -0.795 -0.026
(0.234) (0.249)
Became More Worried about Not Being Productive 0.117 0.535
(0.248) (0.251)
Became Less Worried about Not Being Productive -0.320 -0.119
(0.270) (0.298)
Health Shock -0.634 -0.722
(0.168) (0.190)
OOP Medical Expenses Jump by 25%+ -0.006 0.081
(0.129) (0.146)
Lost Health Insurance 0.053 0.159
(0.189) (0.206)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.086 0.119
Number of Observations 1896 1896
Notes: Sample is all individuals observed at least 4 years after first retirement. Multinomial logit coefficients are reported. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at household 
level. Each model also includes an intercept, retirement calendar year dummies, and 6 dummy variables for missing values on variables in Model 1, and 9 such dummies in Model 2 
(most statistically insignificant).  ASINH is the inverse hyperbolic sine function, such that asinh(z)=ln(z+sqrt(1+z^2)).  In neither model does a generalized Hausman test reject IIA.Table 5. Characteristics of Pre- and Post-Retirement Jobs
Unretirement Jobs
Job Characteristics Pre-Retirement Jobs Partial Retirement Jobs Part-Time Full-Time
Median Hourly Wage $15.45 $10.32 $8.35 $9.00
Median Annual Earnings $29,646 $10,681 $2,089 $7,863
Median Ratio Post-Ret./Pre-Ret. Earnings 1.0 50.2 7.6 25.7
Part-Time Job 18.1 100.0 100.0 0.0
Hours Worked per Week 40.6 19.8 18.9 42.2
Weeks Worked per Year 49.5 41.8 36.1 49.6
Self-Employed 18.7 31.6 24.0 27.8
Health Insurance 65.8 44.2 35.5 48.3
Job is Stressful  62.7 33.9 23.8 40.1
Job Requires "Lots of Physical Effort" 34.0 29.6 28.6 35.1
Job Requires Stooping/Kneeling 22.7 19.9 21.1 23.9
Job Requires Good Eyesight 89.9 86.3 82.6 91.4
Job Requires Heavy Lifting 13.6 10.2 8.0 12.6
Industry
Ag/Forestry/Mining/Construction 10.3 12.1 12.8 18.4
Manufacturing 24.2 11.2 8.4 15.5
Wholesale/Retail 14.0 18.1 16.1 14.5
Services 51.4 58.6 62.8 51.6
Occupation
Managerial/Professional Specialty 37.8 32.3 26.7 25.8
Sales/Admin Support 26.6 27.9 29.7 32.6
Services 11.4 16.9 15.3 13.6
Precision Production/Craft/Repair 13.1 13.0 12.7 16.6
Operators/Laborers 11.1 9.8 15.6 11.4
Notes: Occupation and industry classifications based on aggregated 3-digit 1980 U.S. Census Occupation Codes and aggregated 3-digit 1980 Census Standard Industrial 
Classification Codes.  All dollar amounts in 2000$. "Job is Stressful" is a dummy for whether the job is stressful all or most of the time. Similarly, the job requirement variables (i.e., 
Physical Effort, Sooping, Eyesight, Lifting) are dummies for whether the job has the named characteristic all or most of the time.Appendix Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Sample 
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Observation Period (Years) 6.6 1.6 4.0 10.3
Demographics & Health (Pre-Retirement)
Retirement Age 59.7 3.3 51.0 67.0
Male 51.4 50.0 0.0 100.0
Black 8.6 28.0 0.0 100.0
Hispanic 4.1 19.9 0.0 100.0
Other 1.7 13.1 0.0 100.0
Married 73.3 44.2 0.0 100.0
Education <=12 years 57.0 49.5 0.0 100.0
Fair or Poor Health (Self-Reported) 0.1 0.4 0.0 1.0
Number of Health Conditions 1.2 1.1 0.0 6.0
Retirement Resources (Pre-Retirement)
Income $77,782 $94,528 $0 $2,998,940
Net Worth  $362,014 $616,687 -$548,070 $9,274,540
Self-Employed 12.8 33.4 0.0 100.0
Employer Pension 68.6 46.4 0.0 100.0
Employer Offers Retiree Health Insurance 72.5 44.7 0.0 100.0
Occupation (Pre-Retirement)
Managerial/Professional Specialty 30.8 46.2 0.0 100.0
Sales/Admin Support 23.4 42.4 0.0 100.0
Services 11.1 31.4 0.0 100.0
Precision Production/Craft/Repair 11.0 31.3 0.0 100.0
Operators/Laborers 13.2 33.9 0.0 100.0
Retirement Planning (Pre-Retirement)
Short Planning Horizon 24.0 42.7 0.0 100.0
Plans to Keep Working in Retirement 71.2 45.3 0.0 100.0
Worries About Not Having Enough Income 53.6 49.9 0.0 100.0
Worries About Not Being Productive 35.3 47.8 0.0 100.0
Changes in Resources & Perceptions (Post-Retirement)
Net Worth (Non-Housing) Drops by 25% or More 25.5 43.6 0.0 100.0
Stock Value Drops by 25% or More 16.7 37.3 0.0 100.0
Became More Worried about Income 10.9 31.1 0.0 100.0
Became Less Worried about Income 22.5 41.8 0.0 100.0
Became More Worried about Not Being Productive 16.9 37.5 0.0 100.0
Became Less Worried about Not Being Productive 17.1 37.7 0.0 100.0
Health Shock 21.0 40.7 0.0 100.0
OOP Medical Expenses Jump by 25% or More 48.4 50.0 0.0 100.0
Lost Health Insurance 16.3 37.0 0.0 100.0
Year
1992 4.0 19.5 0.0 100.0
1993 15.5 36.2 0.0 100.0
1994 17.7 38.2 0.0 100.0
1995 17.7 38.2 0.0 100.0
1996 17.1 37.7 0.0 100.0
1997 18.9 39.1 0.0 100.0
1998 9.2 28.9 0.0 100.0
Notes:   Sample is all individuals observed at least 4 years after first retirement.  All dollar amounts in 2000$. 